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{{short description|Organization of mental concepts}}
{{for|categorization in general|Classification}}
{{Use American English|date=November 2021}}
{{Information science}}

'''Categorization''' is a type of [[cognition]] involving conceptual differentiation between characteristics of conscious [[experience]], such as [[Object (philosophy)|objects]], events, or [[idea]]s. It involves the [[abstraction]] and differentiation of aspects of experience by sorting and distinguishing between groupings, through [[classification]] or [[typification]]<ref name="Croft2004ch4"/><ref>{{Cite book |title=Formal Approaches in Categorization |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-521-19048-0 |editor-last=Pothos |editor-first=Emmanuel M. |pages=1 |chapter=Introduction |editor-last2=Wills |editor-first2=Andy J.}}</ref> on the basis of traits, features, similarities or other criteria that are [[Universal (metaphysics)|universal]] to the group. Categorization is considered one of the most fundamental [[cognitive abilities]], and it is studied particularly by [[psychology]] and [[cognitive linguistics]].

Categorization is sometimes considered synonymous with classification (cf., [[Classification (general theory)#Synonyms and near-synonyms|Classification synonyms]]). Categorization and classification allow humans to organize things, objects, and ideas that exist around them and simplify their understanding of the world.<ref name=":0">{{Citation |last1=McGarty |first1=Craig |title=Social Categorization |date=2015 |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B9780080970868240919 |encyclopedia=International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences |pages=186–191 |publisher=Elsevier |language=en |doi=10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.24091-9 |isbn=978-0-08-097087-5 |access-date=2022-11-10 |last2=Mavor |first2=Kenneth I. |last3=Skorich |first3=Daniel P. |url-access=subscription |archive-date=2022-12-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208015513/https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B9780080970868240919 |url-status=live }}</ref> Categorization is something that humans and other organisms ''do'': "doing the right thing with the right '''''kind''''' of thing." The activity of categorizing things can be nonverbal or verbal. For humans, both concrete objects and abstract ideas are recognized, differentiated, and understood through categorization. Objects are usually categorized for some adaptive or pragmatic purposes.

Categorization is [[symbol grounding problem|grounded]] in the features that distinguish the category's members from nonmembers. Categorization is important in learning, prediction, [[inference]], [[decision making]], language, and many forms of organisms' interaction with their environments.

== Overview ==

'''Categories''' are distinct collections of concrete or abstract instances (category members) that are considered equivalent by the cognitive system. Using category knowledge requires one to access [[mental representation]]s that define the core features of category members (cognitive psychologists refer to these category-specific mental representations as [[concept]]s).<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Murphy |first1=Gregory L. |last2=Medin |first2=Douglas L. |date=1985 |title=The role of theories in conceptual coherence. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0033-295X.92.3.289 |journal=Psychological Review |language=en |volume=92 |issue=3 |pages=289–316 |doi=10.1037/0033-295X.92.3.289 |pmid=4023146 |issn=1939-1471|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last1=Markman |first1=Arthur B. |last2=Ross |first2=Brian H. |date=2003 |title=Category use and category learning. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.592 |journal=Psychological Bulletin |language=en |volume=129 |issue=4 |pages=592–613 |doi=10.1037/0033-2909.129.4.592 |pmid=12848222 |issn=1939-1455|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

To categorization theorists, the categorization of objects is often considered using [[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomies]] with three hierarchical levels of [[abstraction]].<ref name="ReferenceA">{{Cite journal |last1=Rosch |first1=Eleanor |last2=Mervis |first2=Carolyn B |last3=Gray |first3=Wayne D |last4=Johnson |first4=David M |last5=Boyes-Braem |first5=Penny |date=1976-07-01 |title=Basic objects in natural categories |journal=Cognitive Psychology |language=en |volume=8 |issue=3 |pages=382–439 |doi=10.1016/0010-0285(76)90013-X |s2cid=5612467 |issn=0010-0285}}</ref> For example, a plant could be identified at a high level of abstraction by simply labeling it a flower, a medium level of abstraction by specifying that the flower is a rose, or a low level of abstraction by further specifying this particular rose as a dog rose. Categories in a taxonomy are related to one another via class inclusion, with the highest level of abstraction being the most inclusive and the lowest level of abstraction being the least inclusive.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> The three levels of abstraction are as follows:
* '''Superordinate level, Genus''' (e.g., Flower) - The highest and most inclusive level of abstraction. Exhibits the highest degree of generality and the lowest degree of within-category similarity.<ref name="Markman, A. B. 1997">{{Cite journal |last1=Markman |first1=Arthur B. |last2=Wisniewski |first2=Edward J. |year=1997 |title=Similar and different: The differentiation of basic-level categories. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0278-7393.23.1.54 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=54–70 |doi=10.1037/0278-7393.23.1.54 |s2cid=18585288 |issn=1939-1285|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
* '''Basic Level, Species''' (e.g., Rose) - The middle level of abstraction. Rosch and colleagues (1976) suggest the basic level to be the most cognitively efficient.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Basic level categories exhibit high within-category ''similarities'' and high between-category ''dissimilarities''. Furthermore, the basic level is the most inclusive level at which category exemplars share a generalized identifiable shape.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Adults most-often use basic level object names, and children learn basic object names first.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
* '''Subordinate level''' (e.g., Dog Rose) - The lowest level of abstraction. Exhibits the highest degree of specificity and within-category similarity.<ref name="Markman, A. B. 1997"/>

== Beginning of categorization ==

The essential issue in studying categorization is how conceptual differentiation between characteristics of conscious experience begins in young, inexperienced organisms. Growing experimental data show evidence of differentiation between characteristics of objects and events in newborns and even in foetuses during the prenatal period.<ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception">{{Cite journal |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |date=2023 |title=Low-Frequency Oscillations for Nonlocal Neuronal Coupling in Shared Intentionality Before and After Birth: Toward the Origin of Perception |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-192 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304192 |doi-access=free |archive-date=2023-12-11 |access-date=2023-12-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231211033632/https://lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-192 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Val Danilov |first1=Igor |last2=Mihailova |first2=Sandra |date= 2022|title=A New Perspective on Assessing Cognition in Children through Estimating Shared Intentionality |journal=Journal of Intelligence |language=en |volume=10 |issue=2 |page=21 |doi=10.3390/jintelligence10020021 |issn=2079-3200 |pmc=9036231 |pmid=35466234 |doi-access=free }}</ref> This development succeeds in organisms that only demonstrate simple reflexes (see articles on the [[binding problem]], [[cognition]], [[cognitive development]], [[infant cognitive development]], [[multisensory integration]], and [[perception]]). For their nervous systems, the environment is a cacophony of sensory stimuli: electromagnetic waves, chemical interactions, and pressure fluctuations.<ref>Treisman, A. (1999). "Solutions to the binding problem: Progress through controversy and convergence." ''Neuron.'' 1999; 24: 105-125.</ref>

Categorization thought involves the abstraction and differentiation of aspects of experience that rely upon such power of mind as [[intentionality]] and [[perception]]. The problem is that these young organisms should already grasp the abilities of intentionality and perception to categorize the environment.<ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception" /> Intentionality and perception already require their ability to recognise objects (or events), i.e., to identify objects by the [[sensory system]].<ref>Val Danilov, I. and Mihailova, S. (2021). "Neuronal Coherence Agent for Shared Intentionality: A Hypothesis of Neurobiological Processes Occurring during Social Interaction." ''OBM Neurobiology'' 2021;5(4):26; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2104113</ref> This is a vicious circle: categorization needs intentionality and perception, which only appear in the categorized environment. So, the young, inexperienced organism does not have abstract thinking and cannot independently accomplish conceptual differentiation between characteristics of conscious experience if it solves the categorization problem alone.

Studying the origins of social cognition in child development, developmental psychologist [[Michael Tomasello]] developed the notion of [[Shared intentionality]] to account for unaware processes during social learning after birth to explain processes in shaping [[intentionality]].<ref name="Tomasello 2019">Tomasello, M. (2019). "Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny." Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: [[Harvard University Press]].</ref> Further, Latvian professor Igor Val Danilov expanded this concept to the intrauterine period by introducing a Mother-Fetus Neurocognitive model:<ref>Val Danilov, Igor (2024). "Child Cognitive Development with the Maternal Heartbeat: A Mother-Fetus Neurocognitive Model and Architecture for Bioengineering Systems". In: Ben Ahmed, M., Boudhir, A.A., Abd Elhamid Attia, H.F., Eštoková, A., Zelenáková, M. (eds) ''Information Systems and Technological Advances for Sustainable Development. DATA 2024. Lecture Notes in Information Systems and Organisation,'' vol 71. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-75329-9_24 </ref> a hypothesis of neurophysiological processes occurring during [[Shared intentionality]].<ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception" /> The hypothesis attempts to explain the beginning of cognitive development in organisms at different levels of bio-system complexity, from interpersonal dynamics to neuronal interactions.<ref>Val Danilov, I. (2023). "Theoretical Grounds of Shared Intentionality for Neuroscience in Developing Bioengineering Systems." ''OBM Neurobiology'' 2023; 7(1): 156; doi:10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2301156</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Val Danilov |first=Igor |date=2023 |title=Shared Intentionality Modulation at the Cell Level: Low-Frequency Oscillations for Temporal Coordination in Bioengineering Systems |url=https://www.lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-185 |journal=OBM Neurobiology |language=en |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=1–17 |doi=10.21926/obm.neurobiol.2304185 |doi-access=free |archive-date=2023-12-10 |access-date=2023-12-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231210001325/https://lidsen.com/journals/neurobiology/neurobiology-07-04-185 |url-status=live }}</ref> Evidence in neuroscience supports the hypothesis. Hyperscanning research studies observed inter-brain activity under conditions without communication in pairs while subjects were solving the shared cognitive problem, and they registered an increased inter-brain activity in contrast to the condition when subjects solved a similar problem alone.<ref>Liu, J., Zhang, R., Xie, E. et al. (2023). "Shared intentionality modulates interpersonal neural synchronization at the establishment of communication system." ''Commun Biol'' 6, 832 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-023-05197-z </ref><ref>Painter, D.R., Kim, J.J., Renton, A.I., Mattingley, J.B. (2021). "Joint control of visually guided actions involves concordant increases in behavioural and neural coupling." ''Commun Biol.'' 2021; 4: 816.</ref><ref>Hu, Y., Pan, Y., Shi, X., Cai, Q., Li, X., Cheng, X. (2018). "Inter-brain synchrony and cooperation context in interactive decision making." ''Biol Psychol.'' 2018; 133: 54-62.</ref><ref>Fishburn, F.A., Murty, V.P., Hlutkowsky, C.O., MacGillivray, C.E., Bemis, L.M., Murphy, M.E., et al. (2018). "Putting our heads together: Interpersonal neural synchronization as a biological mechanism for shared intentionality." ''Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci.'' 2018; 13: 841-849.</ref><ref>Szymanski, C., Pesquita, A., Brennan, A.A., Perdikis, D., Enns, J.T., Brick, T.R., et al. (2017). "Teams on the same wavelength perform better: Inter-brain phase synchronization constitutes a neural substrate for social facilitation." ''Neuroimage.'' 2017; 152: 425-436.</ref><ref>Astolfi, L., Toppi, J., De Vico Fallani, F., Vecchiato, G., Salinari, S., Mattia, D., et al. (2010). "Neuroelectrical hyperscanning measures simultaneous brain activity in humans." ''Brain Topogr.'' 2010; 23: 243-256.</ref> These data show that collaborative interaction without sensory cues can emerge in mother-child dyads, providing [[Shared intentionality]].<ref name="Val Danilov 2023 Origin of Perception" /> It shows the mode to cognize at the stage without communication and abstract thinking.
The significance of this knowledge is that it can reveal the new direction to study [[consciousness]] since the latter refers to awareness of internal and external existence relying on [[intentionality]], [[perception]] and categorization of the environment.

== Theories ==

=== Classical view ===
{{main|Categories (Aristotle)}}
The '''classical theory of categorization''', is a term used in [[cognitive linguistics]] to denote the approach to categorization that appears in Plato and Aristotle and that has been highly influential and dominant in Western culture, particularly in philosophy, linguistics and psychology.<ref name="Taylor1995ch2"/><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lakoff |first=George |title=Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=1987 |isbn=0-226-46803-8 |location=Chicago |oclc=14001013 |author-link=George Lakoff}}</ref> Aristotle's categorical method of analysis was transmitted to the [[Scholasticism|scholastic]] medieval university through Porphyry's [[Isagoge]]. The classical view of categories can be summarized into three assumptions: a category can be described as a list of [[necessary and sufficient condition|necessary and sufficient]] features that its membership must have, categories are discrete in that they have clearly defined boundaries (either an element belongs to one or not, with no possibilities in between), and all the members of a category have the same status. (There are no members of the category which belong more than others).<ref name="Croft2004ch4"/><ref name="Embley2006">{{Cite book |title=Conceptual Modeling: ER 2006: 25th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling, Tucson, AZ, USA, November 6-9, 2006: proceedings |publisher=Springer |editor1=David W. Embley |editor2=A. Olivé |editor3=Sudha Ram |year=2006 |isbn=978-3-540-47227-8 |location=Berlin |oclc=262693303}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=November 2022}}<ref name="Taylor1995ch2">{{Cite book |last=Taylor |first=John R. |title=Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=1995 |isbn=0-19-870012-1 |edition=2nd |location=Oxford [England] |pages=21–24 |oclc=32546314}}</ref> In the classical view, categories need to be clearly defined, mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive; this way, any entity in the given classification universe belongs unequivocally to one, and only one, of the proposed categories.{{citation needed|date=January 2021}}

The classical view of categories first appeared in the context of [[Western Philosophy]] in the work of [[Plato]], who, in his [[Statesman (dialogue)|Statesman]] dialogue, introduces the approach of grouping objects based on their similar [[Property (philosophy)|properties]]. This approach was further explored and systematized by [[Aristotle]] in his [[Categories (Aristotle)|Categories]] treatise, where he analyzes the differences between [[Class (philosophy)|class]]es and [[Object (philosophy)|object]]s. Aristotle also applied intensively the classical categorization scheme in his approach to the classification of living beings (which uses the technique of applying successive narrowing questions such as "Is it an animal or vegetable?", "How many feet does it have?", "Does it have fur or feathers?", "Can it fly?"...), establishing this way the basis for [[natural kind|natural]] [[Taxonomy (biology)|taxonomy]].

Examples of the use of the classical view of categories can be found in the western philosophical works of [[Descartes]], [[Blaise Pascal]], [[Spinoza]] and [[John Locke]], and in the 20th century in [[Bertrand Russell]], [[G.E. Moore]], the [[logical positivists]]. It has been a cornerstone of [[analytic philosophy]] and its [[conceptual analysis]], with more recent formulations proposed in the 1990s by [[Frank Cameron Jackson]] and [[Christopher Peacocke]].<ref name="Pashler2012">
{{Cite book |last=Pashler |first=Harold |title=Encyclopedia of the Mind |date=2012-12-10 |publisher=SAGE Publications |isbn=978-1-5063-1938-4}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Jackson |first=Frank |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/3190 |title=From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis |date=2000-03-09 |publisher=Oxford University PressOxford |isbn=978-0-19-825061-6 |edition=1 |language=en |doi=10.1093/0198250614.001.0001 |archive-date=2022-11-10 |access-date=2022-11-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221110025212/https://academic.oup.com/book/3190 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Peacocke |first=Christopher |url=https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/4676/A-Study-of-Concepts |title=A Study of Concepts |date=1995-09-25 |language=en |doi=10.7551/mitpress/6537.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-262-28131-7 |archive-date=2022-11-10 |access-date=2022-11-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221110025212/https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/4676/A-Study-of-Concepts |url-status=live }}</ref> At the beginning of the 20th century, the question of categories was introduced into the empirical social sciences by Durkheim and Mauss, whose pioneering work has been revisited in contemporary scholarship.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Durkheim |first1=Emile |title=quelques formes primitives de classification |last2=Mauss |first2=Marcel |last3=Durkheim |first3=Émile |date=2002|publisher=J.-M. Tremblay |isbn=1-55441-218-8 |series=Classiques des sciences sociales. |location=Chicoutimi|doi=10.1522/cla.due.deq }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Alejandro |first=Audrey|date=January 2021 |title=How to Problematise Categories: Building the Methodological Toolbox for Linguistic Reflexivity|journal=International Journal of Qualitative Methods |volume=20|page=160940692110555 |article-number=16094069211055572 |doi=10.1177/16094069211055572 |s2cid=244420443 |issn=1609-4069|doi-access=free }}</ref>

The classical model of categorization has been used at least since the 1960s from linguists of the [[structural semantics]] paradigm, by [[Jerrold Katz]] and [[Jerry Fodor]] in 1963, which in turn have influenced its adoption also by psychologists like [[Allan M. Collins]] and [[M. Ross Quillian]].<ref name="Croft2004ch4">{{Cite book |last1=Croft |first1=William

Cognitive categorization - Revision history